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HARMONIZING EUROPEAN TORT LAW AND
THE COMPARATIVE METHOD
a Review of
BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (Helmut Koziol ed., Sramek 2015)
Michael L. Wells ∗
Keywords: tort law, European Union law, harmonization of EU tort
law
This book is the second of two volumes on “Basic Questions of
Tort Law.” In the first volume, Professor Helmut Koziol examined
German, Austrian, and Swiss tort law. 1 In this volume, Professor
Koziol has assembled essays by distinguished scholars from several
European legal systems as well as the United States and Japan, each
of whom follows the structure of Koziol’s earlier book and explains
how those basic questions are handled in their own systems. 2
Throughout both volumes, Professor Koziol and his collaborators
take a broad view of the topic under discussion, addressing not only
the private law Americans call “tort” but also the role of insurance
schemes in compensating injured persons. An advantage of the organizational scheme is that it facilitates issue-specific comparisons
among the systems. Thus, Professor Koziol has also contributed a
chapter, entitled “comparative conclusions,” in which he identifies
similarities and differences among the various systems. Taken together, the system-specific chapters are a valuable resource for anyone interested in a concise introduction to a particular system or in
direct access to comparisons and contrasts among systems. Koziol’s

∗ Marion and W. Colquitt Carter Chair in Tort and Insurance Law, University of Georgia Law School
1. 1 BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A GERMANIC PERSPECTIVE
(Helmut Koziol ed., Sramek 2012) [hereinafter GERMANIC PERSPECTIVE].
2. The nation-specific essays include Bjarte Askeland (Norway), W. Jonathan Cardi and Michael D. Green (United States), Katarzyna LudwichowskaRedo (Poland), Attila Menyhard (Hungary), Olivier Moréteau (France), Ken Oliphant (United Kingdom), and Keizo Yamamoto (Japan).
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chapter on “comparative conclusions” is an incisive analysis of
those comparisons and contrasts.
Professor Koziol’s goal is more ambitious than simply to provide a convenient and current source of information about similarities and differences in the way of personal injury, harm to property,
and related problems are handled in a variety of legal systems. His
overall aim, which he develops in his chapter on comparative conclusions, is to use the detailed comparative analyses contained in the
two volumes as part of an effort to harmonize tort law across the
member states of the European Union. 3 Thus, the role of comparative law as part of the larger project is to identify areas of agreement
and disagreement across systems, so that work can proceed on confirming the commonalities and resolving out the disputed issues.
This review focuses on Professor Koziol’s ultimate aim of harmonization, and on the contribution of these essays to that project.
Harmonization of tort law across the member states is not just a matter of working out answers to such questions as the content of the
liability rule or whether non-pecuniary harm should be recoverable.
Harmonization raises an issue of European Union federalism. That
question is not explicitly addressed in either volume, yet the value
of the project, and prospects for its success, turn on the answer to it.
I argue that Professor Koziol has not made a convincing case for EU
displacement of member state tort law.
I.
Ever since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the member states of the
European Union have pursued the goal of “an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe.” 4 The Union “shall promote eco-

3. Helmut Koziol, Epilogue to 2 BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 685 (Helmut Koziol ed., Fiona Salter Townshend
trans., Sramek 2015) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE].
4. ROGER J. GOEBEL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION
LAW 3 (4th ed. 2015); for the current treaty provision, see Consolidated Version
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nomic, social, and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.” 5 A central feature of this program is the development of
a common market throughout the European Union, in order to facilitate the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. 6
One means of achieving greater integration of European Union
economies is the harmonization of laws. 7 Professor Koziol is among
those who hope to persuade the European Union to harmonize tort
law, either through a directive that sets forth EU-wide standards and
constraints on how far a member state may deviate from those
norms, or by the enactment of EU regulations that would override
current member state law entirely and impose a uniform body of tort
law on the member states. 8 With that goal in mind, in 2005 the European Group on Tort Law published its “Principles of European
Tort Law.” A few years later, the Study Group on a European Civil
Code and the Research Group on Existing EU Private Law “designed a Draft Common Frame of Reference, presented to the public
in 2008.” 9
The “main justification for harmonisation [is] … that the differences between the legal systems are hindering commercial crossborder transactions in Europe.” 10 Businesses that sell across national borders are disadvantaged because they must learn about and
comply with many different tort systems. Diversity of laws “gives
rise to transaction costs, which can prove to be obstacles to the market, especially for small and medium-sized businesses.” 11 In a related vein, harmonization would reduce uncertainty as to the content
of the applicable law “and could thus lead to a noticeable reduction
of the Treaty on the European Union art. 1, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326) 13
[hereinafter TEU].
5. TEU, Article 3, para. 3.
6. See CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE
FOUR FREEDOMS 3-33 (4th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
7. See GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 499.
8. The distinction between regulations and directives is discussed in id. at
154-55.
9. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 694.
10. Id. at 686 (italics in original).
11. Id. at 687.
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of legal disputes and thus the consequential expenses of cases involving damage that have an international aspect.” 12 Furthermore,
“European citizens—who are encouraged to move around in the European Union—cannot be expected to be very understanding that, in
the case of an accident, they are treated very differently depending
on which legal system is applicable.” 13
For Professor Koziol, comparative analysis is a means to the end
of greater harmonization of European tort law. The point of the two
“Basic Questions” volumes, and of the comparative approach they
take, is to provide information helpful to achieving the harmonization project. He argues that “we have to know even more about the
fundamental ideas of other legal systems to better understand each
other and to explore the different legal cultures and the ways of
thinking in other countries.” 14 Comparative study helps us to “recognize the common bases,” “discover new tools for solving problems, become more open-minded for different ideas and increase the
understanding of fundamental perspectives.” 15 Armed with this
knowledge, we will determine just how far it is feasible to go with
harmonization. Koziol is confident that “if all show good will and
cooperate in a reasonable fashion, we will reach the goal, maybe not
an ideal concept on the first go, but at least the basis for further improvement.” 16
The project’s merit depends on the premise that greater uniformity is an especially valuable goal, so much so as to overcome
competing considerations. Yet there are grounds to question the
need for greater uniformity across the EU in the tort context and to
doubt whether the costs of pursuing it are worth the benefits. In my
view, the essays assembled here provide at least as much, if not
more, support for the anti-harmonization view than for Professor

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 688.
Id.
Id. at 695.
Id.
Id. at 704.

2016]

BOOK REVIEW

543

Koziol’s project. With regard to the role of comparisons in answering the question of whether greater harmonization is called for, I
believe that it is appropriate to compare the EU to the United States,
and to focus the comparison on the question of whether variations
among member state tort laws actually retard the growth of a federation-wide common market. The history of the United States and its
economic success, suggests that a multiplicity of approaches to tort
law does not stand in the way of a strong market economy. Just as
the U.S. successfully copes with a variety of tort systems, so also
may the EU manage to get along without systematic harmonization.
II.
Few would question the value of harmonization in the operation
of a well-functioning market in the EU, including its role in providing greater variety and lower prices for goods and services, and easier movement of persons throughout Europe. It is widely agreed that
the harmonization project over the past fifty years has contributed
to the success of the EU. But merely pointing to the existence of
benefits cannot make the case for greater harmonization in any given
sphere because the benefits of harmonization come at a price. Rather, the strength of that case turns on whether the benefits are worth
the costs. Since the costs and benefits vary depending on context,
the question raised by the effort to harmonize tort law is not whether
harmonization has benefits. Rather, the question is whether the specific benefits of this particular harmonization project is worth the
costs.
Given the variety of factors that matter in making that assessment of costs and benefits, reasonable people will differ on whether
the former outweigh the latter. This volume’s comparisons between
tort regimes may be helpful in making that assessment. In my view,
however, a more illuminating comparison is available. I have in
mind the experience of the United States, for each of the fifty states
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has its own tort system. Nonetheless, the United States has succeeded at establishing and maintaining a national market. That experience seems to me to raise doubts about the claim that disuniformity is a serious impediment to a well-functioning market. There
are nearly twice as many “member states” in the U.S. as in the EU,
and the market is spread over a larger area. In some ways, these features of the U.S. system present greater hurdles to buyers and sellers
than in the EU, yet market participants manage to cope well enough.
Variations among legal regimes do not seem to unduly impede the
free movement of goods, services, people, and capital.
Professor Koziol’s answer to the American counterexample is to
assert that “the legal systems of the EU Member States vary a great
deal more than the legal systems of the states in the USA.” 17 Thus,
“[t]here exists not only a fundamental difference between the common law in England and Ireland on the one hand and the Continental
civil law on the other but also divergences between the civil law
systems.” 18 Much of the force of his argument turns on the former
distinction, between common law and civil law systems. He notes
that “the characteristic feature of the Continental legal systems is
that they are codified, in contrast to English case law.” 19 There are
also differences in the way tort law is organized. Thus, “[c]ontinental laws of damages are somewhat homogenous legal areas… In
contrast, common law proceeds on the basis of a multitude … of
individual ‘torts.’” 20 As for specific rules, he points out that “[t]he
absence of any strict liability for motor vehicles is perhaps the most
marked difference between English law and that of most European
countries.” 21 Punitive damages are more readily available in common law than in civil law jurisdictions. 22 Styles of legal reasoning
differ as well, in ways that are hardly limited to tort law. Common
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 686.
Id.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 701.
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law courts proceed case by case, while continental lawyers “begin
with a general abstract rule, which has been formulated by the legislator.” 23
But Professor Koziol’s catalog of ways in which English and
Continental law diverge may be largely moot, as his point has been
overtaken by the UK’s upcoming secession from the EU. One consequence of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union is that
these differences among EU member states will be far less important
in practice after Brexit. There will no longer be a large EU member
state with a different legal tradition from all the rest. One way to
look at Brexit is that it facilitates harmonization by removing a large
obstacle. On the other hand, the UK’s departure substantially reduces the disuniformity that, under basic EU principles, would justify intervention to protect the single market. By contrast, Ireland is
a small nation whose distinctive legal system has little impact on the
general effectiveness of the common market. It seems inappropriate
to allow the disuniformity between its common law approach and
the Continental approach to drive so consequential a decision as the
harmonization of all of European tort law. As an American might
put it, paying so much attention to Ireland would allow a small tail
to wag a very large dog.
Ireland aside, it is not at all clear that the variations among continental legal systems are much greater than the variations among
the fifty states that make up the United States. As examples of differences among EU member states, Professor Koziol cites “divergences . . . in respect of the notion of fault or wrongfulness, strict
liability and vicarious liability, recoverable non-pecuniary loss and
time limitations.”24 One answer to this claim is that the existence of
variations does not establish that the variations are unmanageable.
The essays Koziol has collected in this volume provide little support

23. Id. at 702.
24. Id. at 695.
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for the notion that the member states of the EU differ in radical ways
in their approaches to tort law, nor does Koziol assert that they do.
The main point is that all of them favor compensation of the victim of an accident, whether through “tort” liability (as a common
lawyer would call it) or through social insurance of some kind. Thus,
according to Professor Moréteau, “the French are convinced that society works better when its members agree to share and equalize the
burden on risk and adopt a solidarity model.” 25 In Norway, according to Bjarte Askeland, “it is important that the victim’s damage is
remedied or the injury compensated in full,” by a combination of
tort law and social insurance. 26 Katarzyna Ludwichowska-Redo
states that “[a] tendency has been noted in Poland over the last decades to strengthen the protection of tort victims,” by “the growing
significance of responsibility independent of fault” and by a “trend
towards objectivizing fault liability.” 27 Attila Menyhard notes that
“the structure, the basic principles and means of risk allocation in
Hungarian law are in line with the main structures and principles of
other jurisdictions,” 28 including a growing role for insurance rather
than fault. 29 Across all of the systems surveyed in the study, “[t]here
is consensus on the essential issue that the responsible injuring party
must in principle pay full compensation—no less, but no more.”30
Of course, in all of these systems there are limits on recovery. Professor Moréteau points out that in France, “much as in common law
or Germanic jurisdictions, significant compensation of pure economic loss is mainly to be found in the contractual sphere.” 31 Another common thread is that victims typically do not recover without
a good reason (often, but not necessarily, fault) to hold the defendant

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 76.
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liable. 32 Yet another is that a victim’s own faulty conduct is relevant
to the amount obtained, but is not an absolute bar. 33
Continental systems differ mainly on the particular means by
which compensation is to be achieved. For example, Professor
Koziol notes the difference between French and German approaches
to accident law. The German Civil Code favors “firm, detailed
rules,” 34 while the French Code (and the Austrian Code as well) “are
formulated in a more general and elastic manner.” 35 Despite these
variations, the underlying aims of tort liability are similar throughout the Continental systems. As Professor Koziol notes in his treatment of the Germanic perspective in volume I, “[i]n Continental Europe, it is generally recognized that the primary aim of the law of
tort is to compensate the victim for damage sustained.” 36 He adds
that “[i]t is widely recognized today that besides this compensatory
function … the law of tort serves a deterrent function.” 37 Yet in his
“comparative conclusions,” Professor Koziol pays more attention to
variation on matters of detail among EU member states than he does
to their general agreement on basic principles.
Turning to the U.S. side of the comparison, Professor Koziol
may not fully appreciate the level of variation among the fifty states
of the U.S. For example, he notes differences among EU systems
with regard to damages available to the family members of fatally
injured accident victims. 38 In the U.S., this topic is covered by statutory law in each state because common law courts long ago rejected
recovery for “wrongful death,” as it is called. 39 As in the EU, there
32. See id. at 59-66 (France); id. at 131 (Norway); id. at 220 (Poland); id. at
307 (Hungary); see also GERMANIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 171, 200.
33. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 67-68, 89 (France); id. at
145 (Norway); id. at 234 (Poland); id. at 327 (Hungary); see also GERMANIC
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 256-57.
34. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 704.
35. Id. at 705.
36. GERMANIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 47.
37. Id.
38. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 587.
39. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 783-86 (11th ed., Aspen Publ’g 2016).
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are significant variations among those statutes. Some states only allow for survivors to recover for the amounts they would have received from the deceased, while others provide for recovery of the
whole value of the life. Professor Koziol observes that “[t]he national rules on prescription offer a great diversity of different prescription periods.” 40 But the same is true in the U.S., where statutes
of limitations (as they are called) vary from one state to another. 41
On at least one issue there is more uniformity across EU legal systems than among the fifty states. In the EU the plaintiff’s fault generally reduces but does not preclude recovery. By contrast, Jonathan
Cardi and Michael Green note, in their essay on U.S. law, that many
of the American states allow no recovery if the plaintiff’s share of
the fault is equal to or greater than the defendant’s, and a few treat
any contributory negligence by the plaintiff as a complete bar. 42
Professor Koziol criticizes EU efforts to harmonize private law
by directives on specific topics, such as products liability. Ironically,
his objections belittle his claim that U.S. law features less variation
than Continental Europe. Thus, the current EU approach of “selective harmonization leads … to a double shattering of the law.” One
kind of “shattering” occurs because “the national legal systems become infiltrated by foreign provisions.” 43 This is precisely what
happens on a routine basis in the U.S., whenever the national government preempts state law on some specific topic, such as automobile safety44 or liability for pharmaceuticals. 45 Indeed, a characteristic feature of any federal system in which sovereignty is divided

40. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 828.
41. Id. at 509.
42. Id. at 495-96.
43. Id. at 690.
44. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 120 S. Ct. 1913,
146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000).
45. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 180
L.Ed.2d 580 (2011).
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between the center and the periphery is the presence in a given domain of some issues governed by member state law and other issues
governed by the central authority. 46
The other “shattering of the law” Koziol references here is that
“the EU’s directives and regulations are not based on a consistent
and overall concept and therefore are very often not in accordance
with one another.” 47 His complaint here is that “[e]very directive of
the European Union is a compromise between the varying national
views and the outcome depends on national interests as well as the
nationality and personality of the members of the Commission.”48
The same is true of the law making process of the U.S. Congress
when it displaces state tort law. For that matter, the same would be
true if the EU were to undertake the general harmonization of tort
law favored by Professor Koziol. With particular regard to product
liability, Koziol criticizes the EU’s products liability directive for
failure “to attain a consistent and thus fair overall system.” 49 But the
U.S. has done no better. For example, businesses that sell products
across state lines must take account of three different definitions of
“design defect,” including a “consumer’s expectations” test, a “risk
utility” test, and a “reasonable alternative design” test. 50 Again, U.S.
(and EU) manufacturers have managed to cope with the variety and
uncertainty that is generated by such an untidy system.
III.
Professor Koziol focuses all of his attention on reasons to support EU harmonization of tort law. But his argument is incomplete,
as the Treaty on the European Union does not authorize EU intervention just because there are reasons in its favor. Rather, “[t]he use
of union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity
46. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 488-89 (7th ed., Foundation Press 2015).
47. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 690.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 691.
50. See EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 39, at 704-07.
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and proportionality.” 51 The principle of subsidiarity is that, unless a
topic is within the exclusive competence of the EU, “the Union shall
act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States.” 52 The principle
of proportionality holds that “the content and form of Union action
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the
Treaties.” 53 These constraints on EU intervention are directly relevant to the question of whether to harmonize tort and accident law.
Since these areas are traditionally handled at the member state level,
the principle to subsidiarity seems to place a significant burden on
the advocates for intervention to show why it is not better to leave
well enough alone. Showing that varying legal regimes, and attendant costs, may justify an intervention on a particular topic such
as products liability, but wholesale intervention across all of tort and
accident law may not be a proportionate response.
Despite their presence in the Treaty on the European Union,
these proportionality and subsidiarity provisions are not in most instances strong legal constraints on EU legislation. 54 The Court of
Justice of the European Union has generally taken an expansive
view of EU legislative authority. If EU legislators decide that the
norms of subsidiarity and proportionality are satisfied, these norms
may well be sufficiently supple to permit Professor Koziol’s proposal to withstand a challenge in the Court of Justice. In any event,
it is useless to try to assess the legal viability of a harmonization
directive or regulation until one is enacted, or at least a concrete proposal is advanced.
Even so, the proportionality and subsidiarity constraints are
highly relevant to the legislative policy issue of whether EU intervention is called for, all the more so in an era when the enthusiasts
of closer EU integration meet with ever greater resistance from some
51. TEU, supra note 4, at art. 5, para. 1.
52. Id. at art. 5, para. 3.
53. Id. at art. 5, para. 4.
54. See GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 173 (discussing subsidiarity); id. at
201-08 (discussing the somewhat stronger principle of proportionality).
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of the member states. Accordingly, it is not premature to suggest
that, in deciding whether and how far to go forward with this harmonization project, EU legislators must take account not only of the
benefits of harmonization, but also of the costs of displacing member state law. If the benefits of disuniformity are sufficiently great,
EU legislators may find that they outweigh the arguments favoring
an EU-wide system of tort law. Thus, the case for EU intervention
is not complete without asking whether the costs of displacing member state control are worth the benefits of uniformity.
General costs of any EU displacement of member state law, in
this or any other context, are the loss of local autonomy and a lesser
role for democratic decision making, as unelected officials in Brussels override local office holders who are directly accountable to
voters. 55 In the specific context of tort law, member states may differ
among themselves on the precise mix of policy objectives, such that
a “one-size-fits-all” rule would necessarily deprive at least some of
them of the opportunity to pursue their goals. For example, the Norwegian approach to accident law puts considerable weight on the
compensation of victims and spreading of losses through insurance.
This policy is followed so intently that tortfeasors may escape liability entirely when insurance is available. 56 As a result, such goals
as corrective justice and deterrence may be sacrificed. Other member states may put more weight on the latter set of goals. While the
current approach permits this kind of variety, the harmonization of
European tort law would threaten it. Similarly, some member states
are more receptive than others to the recovery of non-pecuniary
damages. Professor Koziol sees this divergence as a tough problem
that raises “fundamental questions,” 57 which he addresses at some
55. For a summary of the values promoted by state autonomy in the U.S.
context, see KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
110-11 (19th ed., Foundation Press 2016). It may not be appropriate to draw a
close analogy between the U.S. and the EU, as the member states of the EU have
considerably more autonomy than the fifty states of the U.S.
56. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 100.
57. Id. at 768.
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length. From a perspective that values the diversity that comes with
federalism, the variety of approaches is not a problem. In fact, we
may over time gather valuable information from observing the effects of one approach over another. 58
The diversity one currently observes may not be fully explained
by divergent values. Different approaches to a given problem may
be due to variations in the level of one or another type of dangerous
conduct. If drivers in one member state take greater risks than in
another, it may be appropriate to impose greater personal tort liability in the former than the latter in order to induce drivers to be more
careful. Without unduly disparaging the skills of French drivers, it
is worth noting that in France, if not in Norway, “reckless drivers
end up paying significantly higher premiums, whilst a careful driver
with no accident liability on record may see his or her premium reduced by half.” 59
Legal culture may differ from one member state to another, such
that judges will be more familiar with one style of reasoning than
another. Professor Koziol distinguishes between two approaches.
On the one hand, German tort law is characterized by firm, detailed
rules.” 60 On the other, the Austrian and French principles “are formulated in a more general and elastic manner.” 61 As for himself,
Professor Koziol prefers “a middle course” between the two. 62 But
the relevant question is not “what is the optimal approach?” as an
abstract proposition. The German approach may work well in the
German context and the French approach in the French context. The
issue for EU legislators is whether the project of integrating the
economies of EU member states is significantly hindered by simply
58. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
59. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 5 (Olivier Moréteau discussing French law).
60. Id. at 704.
61. Id. at 705.
62. Id. at 707.
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allowing each member state to formulate the law as it sees fit. In
resolving that question it is important to keep in mind that a given
legal system may work differently in its actual operation than is apparent to an outsider. For example, Professor Koziol finds that “[t]he
French legislator and the Cour de Cassation almost never give sufficient reasons and therefore one never knows why a case is solved
in a particular way and one never knows beforehand how the next
case will be solved.” 63 Yet it appears that lawyers and scholars
trained in the French system are able to surmount the difficulties. 64
IV.
My reservations relate solely to the strength of the case for harmonizing European tort law. The research, analysis, and exposition
of the issues in both volumes of “Basic Questions” are exemplary.
A close study of Professor Koziol’s chapter on “comparative conclusions” will repay anyone interested in the comparative study of
tort and accident law. This is an essential volume—as is Professor
Koziol’s volume on the Germanic perspective—for anyone interested in the comparative perspective on these topics.

63. Id. at 704.
64. See MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 38-61,
303-05, 307-11 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).

